2022 was a tumultuous year in Burkina Faso. In just over eight months, the country experienced two successful military coups. The first came in January, when democratically-elected President Mark Roch Kaboré was ousted and replaced by Colonel Paul-Henri Damiba amid mounting tensions over escalating jihadist violence across the country. In the immediate aftermath, the military suspended the constitution, deposed the president, and prompted Burkina Faso’s suspension from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Despite this, Damiba struck a conciliatory tone, promising a return to constitutional rule once “conditions were right” and appealing to the international community for support.

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The second coup upended that fragile order. On September 30, soldiers from “Cobra,” the military’s main counterterrorism unit, mobilized in Ouagadougou and overthrew Damiba. They subsequently announced that 34-year-old army commander Ibrahim Traoré would replace him as the head of state. Traoré is a vehement opponent of the West, particularly France. Since taking power, he has expelled French troops and diplomats from Burkina Faso, accusing France of using its military presence in ECOWAS countries—especially Cote d’Ivoire—to destabilize his government. While France has denied these claims, similar allegations have been levied against France by the government of Mali, Burkina Faso’s regional ally. In January 2025, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger formally withdrew from ECOWAS and established a new alliance, the Alliance of the Sahel States (EAS).

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EAS is united by two defining characteristics: each member state is engaged in combat against jihadist insurgencies, and all are former French colonies. Following the 2011 assassination of Muammar Gaddafi and the subsequent collapse of the Libyan government in 2012, black-market weapons flooded the Sahel (Issaev et al., 2021). Many of these arms found their way to jihadist groups, including the primary organization operating in Burkina Faso, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM). France, which has maintained a security presence in its former African colonies since their independence in the 1960s, naturally intervened to assist counterterrorism efforts. However, these efforts have largely failed to contain the violence, and terrorist activity in Burkina Faso has risen steadily since 2014 (Falkner et al., 2024).

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Traoré’s rule thus far has been far from stable or democratic. Since 2022, terrorist attacks in Burkina Faso have grown both more frequent and more lethal; by 2024, the country ranked first on the Global Terrorism Index. Traoré has also fully embraced authoritarian rule, openly expressing that his country is “not a democracy.” His government has cracked down on journalists, forcibly conscripted critics, and criminalized LGBTQ activities. The Burkinabé military has been accused of executing civilians suspected of jihadist ties. Internationally, Traoré has aligned himself with Russia in the war against Ukraine during a visit to Moscow. Burkina Faso has since received military assistance from Russia’s Africa Corps, the successor to the Wagner Group, Yevgeny Prigozhin’s infamous military contracting group (Falkner et al., 2024).

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Given Traoré’s hostility toward the West, his authoritarian tendencies, and his close ties with Vladimir Putin, observers have discussed the possibility that Russia may replace France as the dominant power in Burkina Faso. Africa is certainly a region of strategic significance for Russia and plays a significant role in Putin’s plan for a multipolar world. Russian forces, initially via the Wagner Group and now through the Africa Corps, have significantly engaged in both the Central African Republic and neighboring Mali (Falkner et al., 2024). However, Russia’s engagement in Burkina Faso has been more limited. Wagner forces were never deployed in Burkina Faso, and in 2024, only around 100 soldiers were deployed to the country through the Africa Corps (Falkner et al., 2024). This is a considerable downgrade from the 400 French troops stationed in Burkina Faso prior to their expulsion. Traoré appears primarily focused on expanding the country’s domestic military capacity, recruiting 14,000 soldiers this past year in addition to the 90,000 volunteer soldiers who joined the armed forces in November 2022. The country has also purchased weapons from China, as Russian military support has waned amid Moscow’s ongoing war in Ukraine.

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Economically, Russia has increased its role in Burkina Faso, particularly in the mineral extraction sector, but it has by no means supplanted France’s presence in the country. Although Russia’s Nordgold mining company now operates the Niou, Bissa, and Bouly gold mines, Nordgold’s contract in Bissa extends back to 2013. Furthermore, Western companies such as Australia’s West African Resources and Canada’s IAMGOLD continue to operate in Burkina Faso. Although some Western firms have withdrawn since 2022, it would be an overstatement to suggest that Russia is replacing them. Since taking power, Traoré has established the state-owned Société de Participation Minière du Burkina (SOPAMIB) and raised taxes on foreign companies from 10% to 15%. This has made it increasingly difficult for foreign firms, including Russian ones, to continue operating in Burkina Faso. SOPAMIB has also nationalized mines previously managed by Lilium Capital and Endeavor Mining, British and American firms, respectively. The fact that Russia continues to operate in Burkina Faso is likely partially motivated by a desire to expand its political ties to the country, but it is more likely that they are in need of revenue streams to fund the Ukraine war. Burkina Faso’s primary goal in its mining sector is to increase state control. There is no evidence of any intention to transfer Western-operated mines to Russia. Traoré may maintain closer ties with Russia than the West with regard to resource extraction, but similarly to his military strategy, his central focus remains on national self-reliance.

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Moreover, France’s economic influence in Burkina Faso extends beyond resource extraction; it lies primarily in its control over the country’s monetary policy. Burkina Faso’s currency, the CFA franc, remains tightly regulated by the French central bank (Koddenbrock & Sylla, 2019). Under this system, Burkina Faso must deposit half of its national reserves in French banks, and the CFA’s value is pegged to the Euro (Koddenbrock & Sylla, 2019). This arrangement applies across many of France’s former West African colonies and has long been a source of both stability and controversy (Koddenbrock & Sylla, 2019). While the CFA franc has helped prevent high inflation, it has also raised persistent questions about national sovereignty (Koddenbrock & Sylla, 2019). Despite viral social media posts suggesting otherwise, Burkina Faso has made no official move to abandon the franc, meaning that, even as Ouagadougou seeks political distance from Paris, the two remain financially intertwined.

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More than anything, Burkina Faso is becoming isolationist. The government has erected political, economic, and military barriers to international cooperation, prioritizing the development of domestic capacity and self-sufficiency. Whether this approach is sustainable remains uncertain. As mentioned previously, the country’s security situation continues to deteriorate, and an insurgent takeover—one that might otherwise have been preventable—remains a real possibility. On the brighter side, gold exports have increased substantially since Traoré assumed power, indicating that the economic barriers imposed have not halted production. Additionally, Burkina Faso is developing its first gold refinery, which would enable it to sell refined gold on the international market — a much higher-value commodity than gold ore. If completed, this project would mark a historic achievement and an essential step toward economic diversification, one unmatched by any previous Burkinabé administration. Burkina Faso is willing to engage with Russia as a strategic ally in achieving their economic and security goals, but they are not seeking out a partnership akin to their relationship with France post-independence.

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References

Issaev, L., Fain, E., & Korotayev, A. (2021). Impact of the Arab Spring on Terrorist Activity in the Sahel. Ideology and Politics Journal, 3(19), 34-49. https://www.ideopol.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/3.-Issaev-Fain-Korotoayev-final.pdf

Koddenbrock, K., & Sylla, N. S. (2019). Towards a political economy of monetary dependency: The case of the CFA franc in West Africa. Max Planck Sciences Po Center on Coping with Instability in Market Societies, (19), iii-30. https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/202323/1/1671513134.pdf

Vallin, V.-M. (2015). France as the Gendarme of Africa, 1960-2014. Political Science Quarterly, 130(1), 79-101. https://www.jstor.org/stable/43828515?searchText=french+security+presence+in+burkina+faso&searchUri=%2Faction%2FdoBasicSearch%3FQuery%3Dfrench%2Bsecurity%2Bpresence%2Bin%2Bburkina%2Bfaso%26so%3Drel&ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_search_gsv2%2Fcontrol&refreqid=fastl

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